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1. Summary
This paper studies the welfare implications of various government policies on the banking
industry: suspension of convertibility, taxation on short term deposits, reserve requirements,
partial or total deposit insurance and capital requirements Bank stability has always been a
major concern for regulators, policymakers and among academics, as the banking system has
traditionally been vulnerable to the problem of banking panics Examples of financial crises
in the history of the financial systems were the Great Depression (1929–1933) which had a
significant impact on the banking system of the US1 or the more recent crises in emerging
countries 2 Given the historical importance of banking panics and their current relevance,
it is important to understand why they occur and what policies should be implemented to
deal with them In this sense, the theoretical research on banking has focused on analyzing
the microeconomic nature of banks and their role in the economy Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), which formalized some of the ideas provided in Bryant (1980), made a significant
contribution by modeling the demand for liquidity and the transformation service provided
by banks
The authors consider a simple model with a continuum of ex ante identical agents who
are risk averse and uncertain about their future time preferences These individuals are born
with one unit of the good at T = 0 and are subject at T = 1 to privately observed risk,
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1 From 1930 to 1933 the number of bank failures in the US averaged over 2000 per year, see Mishkin (1995)
2 Lindgren et al (1996) find that 73 per cent of the IMFs member countries suffered banking crises between
1980 and 1996
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with probability α of being type 1 who derive utility only from consumption in the first
period and probability 1 − α of being type 2 who derive utility only from consumption in
the second period. There is an investment technology such that a unit investment at T = 0
yields one unit at T = 1 or R > 1 units at T = 2. In autarky, early consumers liquidate their
investment at T = 1 and consume one unit whereas late consumers maintain the technology
and receive R > 1 at T = 2.
Diamond and Dybvig show how a financial intermediary can improve ex ante welfare
by offering consumers a deposit contract. Suppose that banks operate in a competitive
environment; hence, the optimal contract is the one that maximizes the expected utility
of the agents subject to a zero profit constraint. This deposit contract promises investors
a higher payoff for early consumption and a lower payoff for late consumption compared
to autarky. Type 1 agents are insured against being early consumers in the sense that they
receive some of the benefits available from the long term technology.
In the original Diamond and Dybvig model, there are two Pareto-ordered Nash equilibria:
a Pareto dominant equilibrium that achieves socially optimal risk sharing which has only
type 1 agents withdrawing at T = 1, and a second Pareto dominated equilibrium in which
all agents withdraw at T = 1 and can be interpreted as a bank run. Finally, the model shows
that there are several measures to prevent the bank run equilibrium.3
However, this seminal paper attracted an important criticism for assuming that bank
runs are random phenomena, and thus, uncorrelated with other economic variables. Gorton
(1988), in an empirical study of bank runs in the US during the National Banking Era
(1863–1913), found support for the notion that bank runs tended to occur after business
cycle peaks.
Second, models of information-induced runs assert that bank runs occur due to the
diffusion of negative information among depositors about bank’s solvency, that is, bank
runs are related to the state of the business cycle, as supported by the empirical evidence.
Examples of this literature are Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Jacklin and Bhattacharya
(1988), Alonso (1996) and Allen and Gale (1998), among others.4
Zhu’s paper follows the business cycle view, as to the origins of banking panics. The
model is based on Allen and Gale (1998). There are three periods. Two assets are available
in period 0: a storage technology and a risky one. The riskless asset transforms one unit
of consumption in any period t to one unit of consumption in a period t + 1. The risky
asset yields a random return ˜R in period 2, and can be liquidated prematurely at a cost.
On the consumer side, there is a continuum of depositors, that are born with one unit of
endowment in year 0, and are subject to a preference shock in year 1. As in Diamond and
Dybvig, they can be of type 1 with probability α and of type 2 with probability 1 − α.
As there is no aggregate uncertainty in the model, a fraction α of agents will be of type
3 In the case in which there is no aggregate uncertainty, a suspension of convertibility policy in which withdrawals
up to α are allowed would implement the good Nash equilibrium This policy removes the incentives of type 2
depositors to withdraw early, as independently on what other agents do, they always obtain a higher payoff if they
wait until the second period than if they withdraw However, if there is aggregate uncertainty, this measure may not
be so effective, depending on the realized α In this case, they advocate for Federal Deposit Insurance (guaranteed
by governmental funds) as the effective mechanism that would implement the Pareto dominant equilibrium
4 It should be mentioned that there are a number of recent papers that study banking panics in the context of the
entire banking system, as Chen (1999), Freixas et al (2000), Allen and Gale (2000) or Aghion et al (2000)
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1 and a fraction 1 − α of type 2. Finally, there is a perfectly competitive banking system
that offers individuals a demand deposit contract, in exchange for their endowment. This
contract provides a risk sharing mechanism against uncertainty in liquidity needs. It will
specify both a short term interest rate (r1) and a long term one (r2). Formally, r1 and r2
are obtained by maximizing the expected utility of agents subject to resource and incentive
compatibility constraints. It should be noticed that the long term interest rate will be state
contingent (as the bank invests in a random technology, it may not be able to guarantee the
promised long term interest rate), and so there is a threshold value of the random return,
R∗, below which the contract is no longer incentive compatible and therefore type 2 agents
will prefer to withdraw in the first period. In fact, when the return is low, all type 2 agents
will run on the bank and will force the bank to liquidate its assets at a loss. Therefore, bank
runs are costly and destroy the risk sharing mechanism.
The allocation achieved in this benchmark model is compared with two types of socially
optimal allocations: the first one is the Allen and Gale (AG) optimum, which diversifies the
idiosyncratic preference shock and involves no liquidation of the risky asset. It is obtained





˜R[αU(c1(R)) + (1 − α)U(c2(R))]} (1)
s.t.
αc1(R) ≤ 1 − x
(1 − α)c2(R) + αc1(R) ≤ xR+ 1 − x
c1(R) ≤ c2(R)
(2)
where c1(R), c2(R) represent consumption in years 1 and 2 respectively and x is the in-
vestment in the risky asset. There are two possible solutions: When the return is low, the
optimal allocation involves carrying over some of the liquid asset to year 2, to supplement
the low realization of the risky asset. All agents receive an equal payment.5
c1(R) = c2(R) = xR+ 1 − x (3)
On the contrary, when the return is high, the bank exhausts the liquid asset in year 1, as
consumption in year 2 will be high, in any case.6
c1(R) = 1 − x
α
c2(R) = xR1 − α
(4)
It should be noticed that in this allocation, the aggregate risk related to the risky asset still
exists, as the consumption levels are state contingent. However, if the social planner could
5 The condition for this case to hold is obtained by substituting the optimal consumption levels in the first
resource constraint, that is: if αc1(R) ≤ 1 − x or equivalently, R ≤ ((1 − x)(1 − α))/(xα) = R∗
6 Similarly, the condition for this case to hold is obtained by substituting the optimal consumption levels in the
incentive compatibility constraint, that is: if c1(R) ≤ c2(R) or equivalently, ((1 − x)(1 − α))/(xα) = R∗ ≤ R
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use the profits in good states to subsidize the interest payment in bad states, the aggregate
risk would be removed, and agents would receive a fixed consumption regardless of the state
of the economy. This allocation would be the first best optimum, and is characterized by:
c1 = 1 − x
α
c2 = xE(R)1 − α
(5)
However, in this case, one has to assume that the social planner has outside resources,
not available to private agents, so that he deliver the expected value.
Once the socially optimal allocations have been defined, the paper analyzes different
regulation measures to prevent banking panics. The above mentioned framework enables
the author to consider the ex ante and ex post effect of the different instruments: Suspension
of convertibility, reserve requirements and taxation on short term deposits turn out to be both
ex ante and ex post inefficient to prevent banking panics. They produce either a misallocation
effect in the case of suspension or distortions in the bank’s investments decisions, in the
case of the other two policies. On the other hand, a full deposit insurance system would
be ex post efficient to prevent banking panics, but is ex ante inefficient due to the moral
hazard problem. In this sense, an interest-cap deposit insurance scheme overcomes the
moral hazard problem and achieves the first best optimum. Finally, capital requirements
may also achieve the first best optimum, provided the level of capital is high enough.
2. Comments
The paper deals with an interesting and important topic, which is analyzing the causes of
banking panics so as to make adequate policy prescriptions and does a complete analysis of
the main existing regulatory policies. There are few theoretical papers7 that have analyzed
the ex ante effects of banking regulation, and in this sense, this paper is an interesting
contribution to the theoretical literature.
As already mentioned, this paper is based on Allen and Gale (1998)(hereafter AG).
However, the main difference with respect to the AG model, is that in this paper, the risky
asset can be liquidated prematurely at a cost. This assumption is crucial in the paper for the
results obtained herein:
The illiquidity assumption in AG (first section of the paper) plays an important role
in that model: first, bank runs are always partial. As long as the value of the risky asset is
greater than zero there is always a fraction of type 2 consumers that wait to withdraw in year
2, as otherwise second period consumption would become infinite. Second, demand deposit
contracts and bank runs achieve the first best allocation (AG optimum). In other words, when
bank runs occur in equilibrium, there is always a unique proportion of type 2 consumers
(less than the total one), given by: α1(R) = ((1 − x)/(1 − x+ xR)) − α, that equates the
consumption of both types of agents and therefore replicates the optimal allocation. Finally,
pure panic runs are always excluded.
7 Recent examples are Freixas and Gabillon (1999) or Samartin (2002)
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On the contrary, when the risky asset can be liquidated prematurely at a cost, bank runs
are no longer partial, they involve all type 2 consumers and cause the costly liquidation of
assets. As a result, demand deposits and bank runs do not longer achieve the AG optimum.
Finally, pure panic runs need to be eliminated using an equilibrium selection mechanism.
A second point is related to the specification of the AG optimum, in this paper. Why is
not liquidation specified as a possibility although it is not optimal? The author assumes an
exogenous and very low liquidation value of the risky asset, and therefore, it is true that
liquidation turns out not to be optimal. However, partial liquidation of the risky asset may
be optimal for greater liquidation values. In this respect, the author might look at a paper
by Hellwig (1994), where he finds that premature liquidation of the long-term technology
is optimal for the second best allocation. And a related point is that as a possible extension
one could assume an endogenous liquidation value (the last section of the Allen and Gale
paper may also shed some light on this direction).
Regarding the welfare analysis of the different policies, and in particular the suspen-
sion policy, it is an intervention measure that was frequently used in the U.S. during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and consists on the banks refusal to exchange cur-
rency for demand deposits upon demand. Gorton (1985) points out that during this period
convertibility was suspended up to eight times in the US.
An interesting aspect is that, even though this measure implied a violation of the deposit
contract, neither depositors nor the banks were against it. It was understood as a temporal
measure to stop banking panics. During this period, the bank tried to solve the liquidity
problem and with the suspension, depositors recovered the confidence in the system by
recognizing the institutions in trouble. Hence, by suspending convertibility, banks can signal
to depositors that continuation of investments is mutually beneficial.
Another important era in which suspension worked quite well, was the Scottish free
banking era. Scotland’s free banks were incredibly disciplined as a result of suspension,
spurring England to pass protective legislation to keep Scottish banks out of the adjoining
market.
The author argues that this measure is not ex ante efficient because it causes a misallo-
cation effect as there is no guarantee that only those agents that have true liquidity needs
will get their payment in year 1. It should be mentioned, however, that in this model, no
sequential service constraint is assumed, and so one could consider that funds are distributed
equally among agents that withdraw in the first period. And also, why do banks suspend
convertibility at a level of α? In this sense, the author might consider what could be called a
state contingent suspension policy. Under this measure, withdrawals up to a level α+ α1(R)
are allowed, where α1(R) = ((1 − x)/(1 − x+ xR)) − α, represents the fraction of type 2
agents that withdraw in the first year, and that depends on the realization ofR. In other words,
this suspension is equivalent to allowing for partial bank runs, and therefore it would achieve
the AG optimum. Therefore, proposition 2, is misleading, because suspension can be ex
ante efficient, if applied at the right level.
With respect to taxation on short term deposits and liquidity requirements, it should be
mentioned that the inefficiencies of both policies are also stated in AG paper.
The author also considers a full coverage deposit insurance system, or blanket guarantee
scheme. The bank pays a premium to the insurance fund, and has its deposits insured.
In this framework, the bank promises depositors interest rates that are no longer state
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contingent, and when its return turns out to be low, depositors are paid by the insurance fund.
It is assumed that the bailout costs can be covered by the insurance premium payment, or
equivalently, the insurance fund or public authority always has enough funds. Therefore, the
social cost of deposit insurance is zero, or equivalently, the depositor supports no deadweight
taxes. Perhaps, this point should be made clearer, as it is key factor in welfare analysis.
Also, as it was pointed out above, the author assumes that the insurance provider can
cover actual losses by providing resources. If the model is interpreted as a three-period
general equilibrium model, this is not possible. Having an insurance premium that equals
the expected payout does not work unless there are more periods or more resources. This
is exactly the same as the specification of the first best allocation. One has to assume that
the government can introduce outside resources.
An interesting result is that partial deposit insurance removes the well known moral
hazard problem, associated to full deposit insurance, and achieves the first best allocation.
Recent empirical studies have also pointed out that explicit insurance systems create more
stable banking systems, see for example Gropp and Vesala (2001), and in reality many
countries do have partial deposit insurance. The problem is as usual the too-big-too-fail
policy, associated to big banks, that are sure of having an implicit coverage. Although this
issue cannot be analyzed in this framework with a perfectly competitive banking system, it
might represent an interesting extension for future research. Another question is whether it
could be possible to construct a risk based insurance premium.
Finally, the paper looks at another widely used tool in bank regulation, which is the
imposition of a capital requirement. In the model, there are other risk-neutral investors who
provide outside resources, to fulfill the capital level. This policy converges to the first best
optimum as the capital ratio approaches the 100 per cent ratio. This implies very high levels
of capital, as the author mentions, and there is also the potential problem of a credit crunch,
as several authors have documented.
Similarly to deposit insurance, capital requirements also assume the introduction of
outside resources. One way to avoid these problems, would be to assume an infinite-horizon
setting, either with infinitely-lived agents or overlapping generations. Alternatively, one
could use explicit partial-equilibrium welfare measures based on consumer’s surplus.
Obviously, all these extensions are beyond the scope of one unique paper, but neverthe-
less, represent interesting lines for future research. In this respect, Zhu’s analysis points the
way to possible resolutions of important issues in banking regulation.
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